We introduce a theoretical framework to study interdependent preferences, where the outcome of others affects the welfare of the decision maker. The dependence may take place in two conceptually different ways, which depend on how the decision maker evaluates his and others' outcomes. In the first he values his outcomes and those of others on the basis of his own utility. In the second, he ranks outcomes according to a social value function. These two representations express two different views of the nature and functional role of interdependent preferences. The first is Festinger's view that the evaluation of peers' outcomes is useful to improve individual choices by learning from the comparison. The second is Veblen's view that interdependent preferences keep track of social status derived from a social value attributed to the goods one consumes.
Introduction
Decision Theory has been mainly concerned with the private side of economic choices: standard preference functionals give no importance to the comparison of the decision makers' outcomes with those of their peers. This is in stark contrast with the large empirical literature that emphasizes the importance of relative outcomes in economic choice: the empirical significance of relative income and consumption has been widely studied, from Dusenberry's early contribution to the many recent works on external habits, the keeping up the with the Joneses phenomenon.
Our first purpose is to fill this important gap between theory and empirical evidence by providing a general choice model that takes into account the concern for relative outcomes. We generalize the classic subjective expected utility model by allowing decision makers' preferences to depend on their peers' outcomes. In order to do so we consider preferences defined over "act profiles," that is, vectors of acts whose first component is agent's own act and the other ones are his peers' acts. The axiomatic system and the representation are simple, and reduce naturally to the standard theory when the decision maker is indifferent to the outcome of others. In particular preferences in our theory are transitive, a fundamental property for economic applications. The representation is described in Section 1.1.
Our second purpose is to provide a sound basis for comparative statics analysis for interdependent preferences. How the relative standing of peers' outcomes affects preferences depends on the decision makers' attitudes toward social gains and losses, that is, on their feelings of envy and pride. We call envy the negative emotion that agents experience when their outcomes fall below those of their peers, and we call pride the positive emotion that agents experience when they have better outcomes than their peers. Attitudes toward social gains and losses describe the way concerns for relative outcomes affect individual preferences. These attitudes differ across individuals. Our second purpose is thus to provide the conceptual tools to make meaningful intra-personal comparisons ("a person is more proud than envious") and inter-personal comparisons ("a person is more envious than another one"). The psychological motivations for the concern for relative outcomes and their main characteristics are discussed in Section 1.2.
The Representation
We consider preferences of an agent o. Let f o , (f i ) i∈I represent the situation in which agent o takes act f o , while each member i of the agent's reference group I takes act f i . According to our main representation result, Theorem 3, agent o evaluates this situation according to:
The first term of this representation is familiar. The index u (f o (s)) represents the agent's intrinsic utility of the realized outcome f o (s), while P represents his subjective probability over the state space S. The first term thus represents the agent's subjective expected utility from act f o . The effect on o's welfare of the outcome of the other individuals is reported in the second term. The index v (f o (s)) represents the social value, as subjectively perceived by o, of the outcome f o (s). Given a profile of acts, agent's peers will get outcomes (f i (s)) i∈I once state s obtains. If o does not care about the identity of who gets the value v (f i (s)), then he will only be interested in the distribution of these values. This distribution is represented by the term i∈I δ v(f i (s)) in (1) above, where δ x is the measure giving mass one to x. Finally, the function is increasing in the first component and stochastically decreasing in the second. This term, which we call the positional index, represents o's satisfaction that derives from the comparison of his outcome with the distribution of outcomes in his reference group.
The choice criterion (1) is an ex ante evaluation, combining standard subjective expected utility and the ex post envy/pride feeling that decision makers anticipate. In choosing among acts decision makers consider both the private benefit of their choices and the externality derived from social comparison. Standard theory is the special case where the function is identically zero. We consider this ex ante compromise as the fundamental trade-off that social decision makers face. This compromise takes a simple additive form in (1), which is a parsimonious extension of standard theory able to deal with concerns for relative outcomes. Behavioral foundation and parsimony are thus two major features of our criterion (1) . In contrast, the ad hoc specifications used in empirical work often overlook this key trade-off and focus only on relative outcome effects, that is, on the component of (1).
Finally, observe that for fixed (f i ) i∈I the preference functional (1) represents agent's within group preferences over acts, which are conditional on a group having (f i ) i∈I . For fixed f o , the preference functional (1) instead represents between groups preferences, which are conditional on the agent's act. Depending on which argument in V is fixed, either f o or (f i ) i∈I , the functional V thus represents preferences within or between groups.
Private and Social Emotions
The index in representation (1) describes the effect on the decision maker's well being of the social profile of outcomes. The social value of these outcomes, as perceived by the decision maker, is recorded by the index v. If v is equal to the index u, the representation is derived in Theorem 2; if it is different, the representation is derived in Theorem 3. These two different representations correspond to two different views and explanations of the effect of the fortune of others on our preferences. To focus our analysis, we concentrate on envy. We propose two, complementary, explanations of this key social emotion, based on learning, dominance, and competition.
A Private Emotion Introspective analysis suggests that when we are envious we consider the outcomes of others, like goods and wealth, thinking how we would enjoy them, evaluating those goods from the point of view of our own utility, and comparing it to the utility that we derive from our own goods and wealth. This interpretation requires u = v in the representation (1) .
This view of envy points to a possible functional explanation: the painful awareness that others are achieving something we consider enjoyable reminds us that perhaps we are not doing the best possible use of our abilities. Envy is a powerful tool of learning how to deal with uncertainty, by forcing us to evaluate what we have compared to what we could have. Envy is, from this point of view, the social correspondent of regret. These two emotions are both based on a counterfactual thought. Regret reminds us that we could have done better, had we chosen a course of action that was available to us, but we did not take. Envy reminds us that we could have done better, had we chosen a course of action that was available to us, but someone else actually chose, unlike us. In both cases, we are evaluating the outcome of chosen and discarded alternatives from the standpoint of our own utility function; that is, u = v in (1) . We regret we did not buy a house that was cheap because we like the house and we envy the neighbor who bought it for the same reason. In both cases, we learn that next time we should be more careful in our choices.
A related view of envy motivates the classic theory of social comparison developed in the field of social psychology by Festinger (1954a Festinger ( , 1954b : People have a drive for a precise evaluation of their own abilities, and an important source of information for such an evaluation is provided by the outcome of others. A corollary of this premise is the similarity hypothesis: individuals will typically be more interested in the outcome of others who are similar, the peers, rather than dissimilar. 1 Envy is, however, an essentially social emotion. We do care whether the successful outcome is simply a counterfactual thought (as in regret) or the concrete good fortune of someone else. We may feel envy even if we do not like at all the good that the other person has. There must be an additional reason for envy, a purely social one.
A Social Emotion The search for dominance through competition is a most important force among animals because of the privileged access to resources, most notably food and mates, that status secures to dominant individuals. The organization of societies according to a competition and dominance ranking is thus ubiquitous, extending from plants to ants to primates. Quite naturally, competition and dominance feelings play a fundamental role in human societies too, whose members have a very strong preference for higher positions in the social ranking: the proposition has been developed in social psychology, from Maslow (1937) to Hawley (1999) and Sidanius and Pratto (1999) . Envy induced by the success of others is the painful awareness that we have lost relative positions in the social ranking. In this view the good that the other is enjoying is not only important for the utility it can provide and we do not enjoy, but also for its cultural and symbolic meaning, that is, for the signal it sends.
Since it is perceived in a social environment, the way in which it is evaluated has to be social and different from the way in which we privately evaluate it. We may secretly dislike, or fail to appreciate, an abstract painting. But, we may proudly display it in our living room if we think that the signal it sends about us, our taste, our wealth and our social network, is valuable. Therefore, we may envy someone who has it, even if we would never hang it in our bedroom if we had it. When the effect of the outcome of others is interpreted in this way, the evaluation index for outcomes is a function v, possibly different from the private utility function u.
The social index v is as subjective as u is: even if they evaluate the outcome of others according to v, individuals have ultimately personal views on what society considers important. An individual may have a completely wrong view of what peers deem socially important; but it is this perception, as opposed to what the decision maker privately values and likes, that is taken into account when evaluating peers' outcomes. This is what subjectively (as everything else in decision theory) the individual regards as socially valuable.
Though conceptually different, the private and social views of envy (and pride) are complementary: we can envy our neighbor's Ferrari both because we would like to drive it (user value) and because of its symbolic value. The index v reflects the overall, cumulative, "outcome externality" that the decision maker perceives, that is, his overall relative outcome concerns. The scope of the social emotion, however, can be behaviorally revealed when the indexes u and v differ. For example, if two outcomes are equally ranked by u, but differently by v, then the different v ranking can be properly attributed to the outcomes' symbolic value. The classic silver spoon example of Veblen well illustrates this case: though the aluminium and silver spoons likely share the same u value, they might well have different v values, entirely due to their different symbolic value. In Section 5 we discuss in some more detail these issues.
Related Literature
The modern economic formulation of the idea that the welfare of an agent depends on both the relative and the absolute consumption is usually attributed to Veblen (1899) . His underlying assumption is that agents have a direct preference for ranking. 2 Fifty years after The Theory of the Leisure Class, social psychology dealt with the issue of social comparison with the works of Festinger (1954a Festinger ( , 1954b . The focus of Festinger's theory is orthogonal to Veblen's: the comparison with others is motivated by learning, and the outcome of the others is relevant to us only because it provides information that may be useful in improving our performance. Veblen and Festinger provide the two main directions in research on social emotions. Our work is an attempt to provide a structure in which these two views can be compared and experimentally tested. Veblen's view has been dominant or even exclusive in inspiring research in Economics (e.g., Duesenberry 1949 , Easterlin 1974 , Frank 1985 . We hope that our paper may help in restoring a more balanced view.
The significance of one's relative outcome standing has been widely studied in the economics and psychology of subjective well-being (e.g., Easterlin 1995 A first theoretical approach had been proposed in Michael and Becker (1973) , Becker (1974) , and Stigler and Becker (1977) in which utility analysis is reformulated by considering basic needs as inputs of agents' objective functions, in place of market consumption goods. For example, Becker (1974) considers an objective function with the "need of distinction" as a primitive argument. The latter are viewed as inputs in household production functions.
More recent work has provided an endogenous explanation for such need for distinction, either for evolutionary reasons or as behavior resulting at equilibrium in a market or a game. For example, the theoretical studies of Samuelson (2004) and Rayo and Becker (2007) investigate the emergence of relative outcome concerns from an evolutionary point of view. They show how it can be evolutionary optimal to build relative outcome effects directly into the utility functions. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) develop a similar intuition in a market economy with conspicuous goods (their consumption is observed) and un-conspicuous goods: agents are willing to bear a cost to signal wealth through conspicuous consumption (see also Ireland, 1994 , and Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004 , for a related game-theoretic perspective on relative outcome concerns).
A possible explanation of social preferences within a neoclassical setting has been pursued by Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite in a series of influential papers starting with their 1992 article. 3 In their analysis, the wealth of an agent allows acquisition of goods that are assigned with a matching mechanism and are not available in the market: instead, they are assigned according to the position of the individual in some ranking (for example, in the ranking induced by wealth). Thus, a higher status allows better consumption because it gives access to goods that are not otherwise available. The non market sector generates endogenously a concern for relative position.
Our aim here is different: we want to provide behavioral foundation for preference functionals that incorporate concern for status, providing a link between choices of agents and their preferences. On this basis we then show how to recover the social values that agents attribute to goods, and other fundamental features of the preferences, in particular the comparative statics analysis. Through these results one can then analyze features of preferences as derived, for instance, in model providing endogenously generated concerns for social position.
Closer to our approach are the papers of Ok and Koçkesen (2000), Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001) , Gul and Pesendorfer (2005) , Karni and Safra (2002) . Ok and Koçkesen consider negative interdependent preferences over income distributions x and provide an elegant axiomatization of the relative income criterion x o f (x o /x), where x is the society average income and f is a strictly increasing function. In deriving their criterion, Ok and Koçkesen emphasize the distinction in agents' preferences over income distributions between relative and individual income effects, modeled by f (x o /x) and x o , respectively. This distinction is a special instance of the general trade-off between private benefits and social externalities we discussed before. 4 
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some preliminary notions, used in Section 3 to state our basic axioms. Sections 4 and 5 contain our main results; in particular, in Section 4 we prove the private utility representation and in Section 5 we derive the social value one. The relation between the two orders is analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 considers a very important special case, where the decision maker is only sensitive to the average of others' payoffs (the most common synthetic representation of society's consumption). Sections 8 and 9 provide behaviorally based conditions on the shapes of the elements of the representations. Inequity Aversion is shown to be a special case of our analysis in Section 10. Finally, Section 11 contains some concluding remarks. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
Preliminaries
We consider a standard Anscombe and Aumann (1963) style setting. Its basic elements are a set S of states of nature, an algebra Σ of subsets of S called events, and a convex set C of consequences. We denote by o a given agent and by N the non-empty, possibly infinite, set of all agents in o's world that are different from o himself, that is, the set of all his possible peers.
We denote by ℘ (N ) the set of all finite subsets of N , with ∅ ∈ ℘ (N ). Throughout the paper, I denotes a generic element of ℘ (N ). For every I, we denote by I o the set I ∪ {o}; similarly, if j does not belong to I, we denote by I j the set I ∪ {j}.
An act is a finite-valued, Σ-measurable function from S to C. We denote by A the set of all acts and by A i the set of all acts available to agent i ∈ N o ; finally
is the set of all act profiles. Each act profile f = f o , (f i ) i∈I describes the situation in which o selects act f o and his peers in I select the acts f i . When I is the empty set (i.e., o has no reference group of peers), we have f = (f o ) and we often will just write f o to denote such profile.
The constant act taking value c in all states is still denoted by c. With the usual slight abuse of notation, we thus identify C with the subset of the constant acts. The set of acts profiles consisting of constant acts is denoted by X , that is,
Clearly, X ⊆ F and we denote by c Io an element x = x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X such that x i = c for all i ∈ I o . 5 Throughout the paper we make the following structural assumption.
Assumption.
A o = A and each A i contains all constant acts.
In other words, we assume that o can select any act and that his peers can, at least, select any constant act. This latter condition on peers implies that the consequences profile at s, f (s) = f o (s) , (f i (s)) i∈I , belong to X for all f = f o , (f i ) i∈I ∈ F and all s ∈ S.
We now introduce distributions, which play a key role in the paper. Let A be any set, for example a set of outcomes or payoffs. If I ∈ ℘ (N ) is not empty, set A I = × i∈I A. Given a vector a = (a i ) i∈I ∈ A I , we denote by µ a = i∈I δ a i the distribution of a. 6 That is, for all b ∈ A, µ a (b) = i∈I δ a i (b) = |{i ∈ I : a i = b}| . 5 Similarly, cI denotes a constant (xi) i∈I . 6 Remember that δa is the measure on the set of all subsets of A assigning weight 1 to sets containing a and 0 otherwise.
In other words, µ a (b) is the number of indices i , that is, of agents, that get the same element b of A under the allocation a.
Let M(A) be the collection of all integer valued measures µ on the set of all subsets of A, with finite support, and such that µ (A) ≤ |N |. That is, 7 M(A) = i∈I δ a i : I ∈ ℘ (N ) and a i ∈ A for all i ∈ I .
In other words, M(A) is the set of all possible distributions of vectors a = (a i ) i∈I in A I , while I ranges in ℘ (N ).
For example, when A is a set of payoffs, pairs (z, µ) ∈ pim (A) are understood to be of the form (payoff of o, distribution of peers' payoffs).
For example, when A is a set of outcomes, a diago-null function is zero whenever o and all his peers are getting the same outcome. When A ⊆ R, a companion set to pim (A) is pid (A), the set of triplets (z, µ, µ ) such that z ∈ A, µ and µ are positive integer measures finitely supported in {a ∈ A : a < z} and {a ∈ A : a ≥ z}, with (µ + µ ) (A) ≤ |N |. If A is a set of payoffs, the elements of pid (A) distinguish peers that are worse off and peers that are better off than o. The natural variation in the definition of diago-nullity for a function defined on pid (A) requires that (z, 0, nδ z ) = 0 for all z ∈ A and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N |.
In the case A ⊆ R the order structure of R makes it possible to introduce monotone distribution functions. Specifically, given a ∈ R I ,
are the increasing and decreasing distribution functions of a, respectively. 8
Given two vectors a = (a i ) i∈I ∈ R I and b = (b j ) j∈J ∈ R J , we say that:
(iii) µ a stochastically dominates µ b if µ a both upper and lower dominates µ b .
Notice that (i) and (ii) are equivalent when |I| = |J|. In this case it is enough, for example, to say that µ a stochastically dominates µ b if F a (t) ≤ F b (t) for all t ∈ R.
Basic Axioms and Representation
Our main primitive notion is a binary relation on the set F that describes o's preferences. The ranking
indicates that agent o weakly prefers society f = f o , (f i ) i∈I where o takes act f o and each i ∈ I takes act f i , to society g = g o , (g j ) j∈J . Note that the peer groups I and J in the two act profiles may be different.
Axiom A. 1 (Nontrivial Weak Order) is nontrivial, complete, and transitive.
Moreover, if the above relations are both strict, there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that
These first three axioms are social versions of standard axioms. By Axiom A.1, we consider a complete and transitive preference . For transitivity, which is key in economic applications, 9 it is important that the domain of preferences includes peers' acts. For, suppose there are two agents, o and −o. The following choice pattern
does not violate transitivity. If, however, one observed only the projection on the first component f o g o h o f o , one might wrongly conclude that a preference cycle is exhibited by these preferences. But, this would be due to the incompleteness of the observation, which ignores the presence of a society, and not to actual intransitive behavior of the agent.
The monotonicity Axiom A.2 requires that if an act profile f is, state by state, better than another act profile g, then f g. Note that in each state the comparison is between social allocations, that is, between elements of X . In each state, o is thus comparing outcome profiles, not just his own outcomes.
Finally, Axiom A.3 is an Archimedean axiom that reflects the importance of the decision makers' private benefit that they derive from their own outcomes, besides any possible relative outcome concern. In fact, according to this axiom, given any profile f o , (f i ) i∈I it is always possible to find an egalitarian profile c Io that o prefers. In this egalitarian profile there are no relative concerns and so only the private benefit of the outcome is relevant. When large enough, such benefit is able to offset any possible relative effect that arises in the given profile f o , (f i ) i∈I . In a similar vein, also a dispreferred egalitarian profile c Io can be always found.
This is a classic independence axiom, which we only require on preferences for a single individual, with no peers.
We have so far introduced axioms which are adaptations of standard assumptions to our setting. The next axioms, instead, are peculiar to our analysis. According to this axiom, for agent o it does not matter if to an "egalitarian" group, where everybody has the same outcome c, is added a further peer with that outcome c. Axiom A.5 thus describes a very simple form of the trade-off, from the standpoint of the preferences of o, between an increase in the size of the society and the change in the outcome necessary to keep him indifferent. In the representation this axiom translates into the condition that the externality function is zero when all members of the group have the same outcome.
Different trade-offs have a similar axiomatization. For example, if o prefers, for the same outcome c, a smaller society, then a similar axiom would require that, for some improvement over c, he would feel indifferent between the smaller society with a less preferred outcome and a larger one with better common outcome. With this more general axiom, the externality function would also depend on the size of the group. 10 Axiom A.5 per se is especially appealing for large groups; in any case, we regard it as a transparent and reasonable simplifying assumption, whose weakening would complicate the derivation without a comparable benefit for the interpretation.
The next final basic axiom is an anonymity condition, which assumes that decision makers do not care about the identity of who, among their peers, gets a given outcome. This condition requires that only the distribution of outcomes matters, without any role for possible special ties that decision makers may have with some of their peers. This allows to study relative outcomes effects in "purity," without other concerns intruding into the analysis.
Preferences that satisfy our basic axioms have a basic representation, which separates in an additive way the direct utility of the decision maker on own outcomes (the function u) and an externality term (the function ) on own and others' outcomes. The comparative statics results hold for this general representation, providing a behavioral characterization of general properties of this externality function.
Theorem 1 A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.6 if and only if there exist a nonconstant affine function u : C → R, a diago-null function : pim (C) → R, and a probability P on Σ such that
represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C).
In this basic representation relative outcome concerns are captured by the externality function : pim (C) → R, which depends on both agent's o own outcome f o (s) and on the distribution i∈I δ f i (s) of peers' outcomes. In fact, a pair (z, µ) ∈ pim (C) reads as (outcome of o, distribution of peers' outcomes).
Such representation is essentially unique:
Proposition 1 Two triples (u, , P ) and û,ˆ ,P represent the same relation as in Theorem 1 if and only ifP = P and there exist α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such thatû = αu + β andˆ = α .
Private Utility Representation
In this section we present our first representation, which models the private emotion discussed in the Introduction.
The basic Axioms A.1-A.6 are common to our two main representations, the private and the more general social one. The next two axioms are, instead, peculiar to the private representation. They only involve deterministic act profiles, that is, elements of X .
Axiom B. 1 (Negative Dependence) If c c then
for all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X and j / ∈ I.
Axiom B.1 is a key behavioral condition because it captures the negative dependence of agent o welfare on his peers' outcomes. In fact, according to Axiom B.1 the decision maker o prefers, ceteris paribus, that a given peer j gets an outcome that he regards less valuable. In this way, he behaviorally reveals his envious/proud nature.
Axiom B.2 is based on the idea that the presence of a society stresses the perceived differences in consumption. For example, interpreting x o as a gain and y o as a loss, the idea is that winning in front of a society is better than winning alone, losing alone is better than loosing in front of a society, and, "hence," a fifty-fifty randomization of the better alternatives is preferred to a fifty-fifty randomization of the worse ones.
We can now state the private utility representation, where we use the notation introduced in Section 2.2. In particular, recall from (2) that pim (u (C)) = u (C) × M(u (C)).
Theorem 2 A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.6 and B.1-B.2 if and only if there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a diago-null function : pim (u (C)) → R increasing in the first component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second one, and a probability P on Σ such that
In this representation relative outcome concerns are captured by the positional index : pim (u (C)) → R, which depends on agent's o evaluation via his utility function u of both his own outcome f o (s) and of the distribution i∈I δ u(f i (s)) of peers' outcomes. This dependence is increasing in o's payoff and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the peers' outcome distribution. This reflects the negative dependence behaviorally modelled by Axiom B.1.
The preferences described by Theorem 2 can be represented by a triplet (u, , P ). Next we give the uniqueness properties of this representation.
Proposition 2 Two triplets (u, , P ) and (û,ˆ ,P ) represent the same relation as in Theorem 2 if and only ifP = P and there exist α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such thatû = αu + β, and
for all z, i∈I δ z i ∈ pim (û (C)).
Social Value Representation
We turn now to the possibility that agents might experience feelings of envy or pride also because of the outcomes' symbolic value. An object may be valuable for the utility it provides to the user, abstracting from the social signal it sends: obviously this is the case for example if the object is used in private. An additional value may derive from the social signal. To illustrate, consider the famous "silver spoon" example of Veblen (1899), which clearly brings out the contrast between user and symbolic values of objects:
A hand-wrought silver spoon, of a commercial value of some ten to twenty dollars, is not ordinarily more serviceable -in the first sense of the word -than a machine-made spoon of the same material. It may not even be more serviceable than a machine-made spoon of some "base" metal, such as aluminum, the value of which may be no more than some ten to twenty cents.
The conceptual structure that we have developed so far allows us to make more precise and behaviorally founded the classic Veblenian distinction between the two values of an object. We formalize this idea by introducing an induced preference˙ on C, which will be represented by a social value function v. Definition 1 Given any c and c in C, set c˙ c
In other words, we have c˙ c when in all possible societies to which the decision maker can belong, he always prefers that, ceteris paribus, a given peer has c rather than c: the externality is thus negative in every case. In particular, only peer j's outcome changes in the comparison (8) , while both the decision maker's own outcome x o and all other peer's outcomes (x i ) i∈I remain the same. The ranking (8) thus reveals through choice behavior a negative outcome externality of j on o.
This negative externality can be due to the private emotion we discussed before; in this case Axiom B.1 holds and, under mild additional assumptions, 12 the rankings and˙ are then easily seen to agree on C (i.e., u = v in the representation). More generally, however, this externality can be also due to a cultural/symbolic aspect of j's outcome. For instance, the Veblen silver and aluminum spoons are presumably ranked indifferent by when this order does not involve social comparisons (that is, when I = ∅), but not by˙ . That is, they have similar u values, but different v values. On the other hand, the two evaluations do not necessarily contradict each other, or even differ, as the case u = v indicates. Social and private value are different conceptually, not necessarily behaviorally. Summing up, we interpret c˙ c as revealing, via choice behavior, that our envious/proud decision maker regards outcome c to be more socially valuable than c. If and˙ do not agree on C, this can be properly attributed to the outcomes' symbolic value.
A simple, but important, economic consequence of the disagreement between and˙ (and so between u and v) are the classic Veblen effects, which occur when decision makers are willing to pay different prices for functionally equivalent goods (see Fershtman, 2008) . Our approach actually suggests a more subjective view of Veblen effects, in which they arise when the goods share a similar u value, possibly because they are functionally equivalent. A caveat is, however, in order. In our envy/pride interpretation the decision maker considers c more socially valuable than c and prefers others to have less socially valuable goods. An alternative interpretation is that the decision maker, instead, considers c more socially valuable and prefers others to have more. Choice behavior per se is not able to distinguish between these two, equally legitimate, interpretations.
The relation˙ is trivial for conventional decision makers who ignore the outcome of others, because for them it is always true that
That is, asocial decision makers are characterized by the general social indifference c∼ c for all c, c ∈ C.
We now present the counterparts of Axioms B.1 and B.2 on˙ . For simplicity, we present the axiom directly on the order˙ rather than on the primitive order .
Axiom A. 7 (Social Order)˙ is a nontrivial, Archimedean, and independent weak order.
Note that the order on C has the properties stated in Axiom A.7, and this guarantees that it has a representation by a utility function u. Here, Axiom A.7 guarantees that the order˙ has a representation by a real-valued affine function v, the social value function. Since˙ is defined in terms of the primitive order , Axiom A.7 can be formulated directly in terms of the properties of . This formulation, which makes the axioms testable, is presented in the Appendix (Section A.10).
The final axiom we need for the social representation is simply the social version of Axiom B.2.
We can now state our more general representation result.
Theorem 3 A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.8 if and only if there exist two nonconstant affine functions u, v : C → R, a diago-null function : pim (v (C)) → R increasing in the first component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second one, and a probability P on Σ, such that v represents˙ and
Relative to the private representation (6), there is now a non-constant affine function v : C → R that represents˙ and so quantifies the social valuation of outcomes. The function v replaces u in the positional index , and so here agent o evaluates with v both his own payoff and the peers' outcome. Like u, also v is a purely subjective construct because˙ is derived from the subjective preference . As such, it may depend solely on subjective considerations.
The preferences described by Theorem 3 are thus represented by a quadruple (u, v, , P ). Next we give the uniqueness properties of this representation.
Proposition 3 Two quadruples (u, v, , P ) and (û,v,ˆ ,P ) represent the same relations and˙ as in Theorem 3 if and only ifP = P and there exist α, β,α,β ∈ R with α,α > 0 such thatû
for all z, i∈I δ z i ∈ pim (v (C)).
Private versus Social
The fact that the preference functional (6) in Theorem 2 is a special case of (9) in Theorem 3 might suggest that Theorem 2 is a special case of Theorem 3. Because of the requirement in Theorem 3 that v represents˙ , this is true provided u also represents˙ , that is, provided and˙ agree on C. Notice that Axiom B.1 guarantees that implies˙ . The converse implication is obtained by strengthening Axiom B.1 as follows.
Axiom B. 3 (Strong Negative Dependence) satisfies Axiom B.1 and, if the first relation in (5) is strict, the second relation too is strict for some x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X and j / ∈ I.
This axiom thus requires that the agent be "sufficiently sensitive to externalities."
Proposition 4 Let on F be a binary relation that satisfies Axioms A.1-A.6. The following statements are equivalent:
satisfies Axioms A.7 and B.1;
(ii) satisfies Axiom B.3;
(iii) coincides with˙ on C.
Remark 1 If is represented as in Theorem 2, then Axiom B.3 is clearly satisfied whenever is strictly increasing in the second component (w.r.t. stochastic dominance). On the contrary, if ≡ 0 we are in the standard expected utility case: Axiom B.1 is satisfied, while Axiom B.3 is violated.
As already observed, Axiom B.1 guarantees that˙ is coarser than . The next example shows that this can happen in nontrivial ways.
Example 1 Assume |S| = |N | = 1 and C = R, and consider the preferences on F represented by
They have a natural interpretation: there is a "poverty line" at 0 and agents do not care about peers below that line. Using Theorem 2, it is easy to check that these preferences satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6 and B.1-B.2. Moreover, it is easy to check that Axiom B.3 is violated. In fact, coincides on R with the usual order, while˙ is trivial on R − and it is the usual order on R + (Proposition 4 implies that Axiom B.3 and Axiom A.7 are violated).
Average Payoff
In view of applications, in this section we study the special case of Theorem 3 in which the positional index only depends on peers' average social payoff. This case is especially tractable from an analytic standpoint and, for this reason, it is often considered in empirical work. This form of reduces social comparisons to a simple comparison between the decision maker and a single other individual, a representative other, holding this average. Other specifications are possible in our setup, for example the one in which only the best and worst outcomes matter. For a detailed treatment see the working paper version Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2009a) of this paper.
Let n be a positive integer and x o , (x i ) i∈I an element of X . Intuitively, we define an n-replica of x o , (x i ) i∈I as a society in which each agent i in I has spawned n − 1 clones of himself, each with the same endowment x i . Formally, we define an n-replica any element
where {J i } i∈I is a class of disjoint subsets of N with |J i | = n for all i ∈ I. We denote the n-replica by
When N is infinite, the addition of this axiom allows to replace in (9) the distribution i∈I δ v(f i (s)) with its (normalized) frequency |I|
Axioms A.9 and A.10 say, respectively, that the agent's preferences are not reversed either by an n-replica of the societies (x i ) i∈I and (y i ) i∈I or by a randomization with a common society (w i ) i∈I .
Next we have a standard continuity axiom.
To state our result we need some notation. The natural version of diago-nullity for a function on K × (K ∪ {∞}) requires that (z, z) = 0 = (z, ∞) for all z ∈ K. 14 Moreover, a function ϕ : K → R is continuously decreasing if it is a strictly increasing transformation of a continuous and decreasing function ψ : K → R. 15 If we add Axioms A.9-A.11 to those in Theorem 3, then we obtain the following representation:
Theorem 4 Let N be infinite. A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.11 if and only if there exist two non-constant affine functions u, v :
R increasing in the first component and continuously decreasing in the second one on v (C), and a probability P on Σ such that v represents˙ and
In the representation (10) decision makers only care about the average social value. For example, if C is a set of monetary lotteries and for monetary outcomes v (x) = x, then -according to (10) -monetary acts are evaluated through
where only the average outcome appears, that is, decision makers only react to the peers' average outcome. This is assumed in many specifications used in empirical work. In this vein, it is also possible to give conditions such that (z, t) = γ (z − t) on v (C) × v (C) for some increasing γ : R → R with γ (0) = 0. For example, this specification is considered by Clark and Oswald (1998) in their analysis of relative concerns: specifically, in their Eq. 1 p. 137, γ corresponds to sv while u corresponds to (1 − s) u − c.
Finally, the uniqueness properties of representation (10) are, by now, standard and given in Proposition 10 of the Appendix.
Attitudes to Social Gains and Losses
The axiomatization of preferences given in the first two basic theorems opens now the way to a behavioral foundation of the analysis of preferences. In this section we assume that satisfies Axioms A.1-A.11, so that the representation (10) holds. c
Throughout this section we denote by D a convex subset of C. An event E ∈ Σ is ethically neutral ifcEc ∼ cEc for some c c in C. Representation (10) guarantees that this amounts to say that the agent assigns probability 1/2 to event E. 16 
Social Loss Aversion
An outcome profile where your peers get a socially better outcome than yours can be viewed as social loss; conversely, a profile where you get more than them can be viewed as a social gain. This taxonomy is important because individuals might well have different attitudes toward such social gains and losses, similarly to what happens for standard private gains and losses.
We say that a preference is more envious than proud (or averse to social losses), relative to an ethically neutral event E, a convex set D ⊆ C, and a given
for all x i , y i ∈ D such that (1/2)
The intuition is that agent o tends to be more frustrated by envy than satisfied by pride (or, assuming w.l.o.g. x i˙ y i , he is more scared by the social loss (x o , x i ) than lured by the social gain (x o , y i )).
Proposition 5 If admits a representation (10), then is more envious than proud, relative to an ethically neutral event E, a convex D ⊆ C, and x o ∈ D if and only if
An immediate implication of Proposition 5 is that, given D and x o , is more envious than proud relatively to an ethically neutral event E if and only if it is more envious than proud relatively to any other ethically neutral event. In other words, the choice of E is immaterial in the definition of social loss aversion.
Social Risk Aversion
More generally, decision makers may dislike uncertainty about their peers' social standing. This suggests to strengthen the notion that we just discussed as follows. Say that a preference is averse to social risk, relatively to an ethically neutral event E, a convex set D ⊆ C, and a given
for all x i , y i , w i ∈ D such that (1/2) x i + (1/2) y i∼ w i . Notice that the previous definition of being more envious than proud requires that (14) holds only for w i = x o . 18 The next result characterizes social risk aversion in terms of concavity of .
Proposition 6
If admits a representation (10), then is averse to social risk, relative to an ethically neutral event E, a convex D ⊆ C, and
Propensity to social risk is defined analogously, and characterized by convexity of (v (x o ) , ·) on v (D). More importantly, the standard analysis of risk attitudes applies to our more general "social" setting: for example, coefficients of social risk aversion can be studied and compared.
Similarly to what happened for social loss aversion, also here it is immediate to see that the choice of E in the definition of social risk aversion is immaterial.
Finally, observe that for the special case (z, t) = γ (z − t) at the end of Section 7, Proposition 6 characterizes the concavity of the function γ and thus provides a behavioral foundation for the comparison-concave utility functions of Clark and Oswald (1998).
Comparative Interdependence
In this section we show how comparative attitudes are determined by the externality function in the basic representation (4) of Theorem 1, which includes all representations considered so far and is based on axioms A.1-A.6. Specifically, we consider two preferences 1 and 2 on F both satisfying A.1-A.6, and for n = 1, 2 we denote by u n : C → R and n : pim (C) → R the two functions representing n in the sense of the representation (4).
Social Ranking Aversion
A decision maker is more averse to social ranking than another one if he has more to lose (in subjective terms) from social comparisons. Formally, say that 1 more ranking averse than 2 if for all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X and c ∈ C
In other words, 1 is more ranking averse than 2 if, whenever 1 prefers a possibly unequal social profile to an egalitarian one, then the same is true for 2 .
Proposition 7 Given two preferences 1 and 2 on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6, the following conditions are equivalent: 19 (i) 1 is more ranking averse than 2 ,
This result thus behaviorally characterizes the function as an index of rank aversion.
Let us have a closer look at ranking aversion. First observe that, by the first part of (ii) of Proposition 7, if two preferences 1 and 2 can be ordered by ranking aversion, then they are outcome equivalent; that is, they agree on the set C (precisely, on {(c) : c ∈ C}).
If we consider the preferences on the set of all outcome profiles, we can then see that comparability according to ranking aversion can be decomposed in two components:
Condition (a) says that, if a society (x i ) i∈I makes the decision maker 2 dissatisfied of his outcome x o , then it makes 1 dissatisfied too. In this case we say that 1 is more envious than 2 . Similarly, (b) means that every time the decision maker 1 prefers to have the intrinsically inferior outcome x o in a society (x i ) i∈I than the superior y o in solitude (or in an egalitarian society), then the same is true for 2. In this case we say that 1 is less proud than 2 .
The next result shows how ranking aversion can be expressed in terms of the two behavioral traits we just described.
Proposition 8 Given two preferences 1 and 2 on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) 1 is more ranking averse than 2 ,
(ii) 1 is outcome equivalent to 2 , more envious, and less proud. 19 Recall that u1 ≈ u2 means that there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that u1 = αu2 + β.
Social Sensitivity
Decision makers are more socially sensitive when they have more at stake, in subjective terms, from social comparisons; intuitively, they are at the same time more envious and more proud. 20 We show that this notion of social sensitivity is characterized in the representation through a ranking of the absolute values of .
Proposition 9
Given two preferences 1 and 2 on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.6, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) 1 is outcome equivalent to 2 , more envious, and more proud, (ii) u 1 ≈ u 2 and (provided u 1 = u 2 ) | 1 | ≥ | 2 | and 1 2 ≥ 0.
Inequity Aversion
We apply the conceptual and formal structure that we have developed so far to provide an easy and transparent characterization of social preferences that are based on a separation of peers into those that are above and those that are below the decision maker: these two subsets of peers affect differently the welfare of the decision maker. In the analysis that follows, higher or lower positions are defined in terms of the utility scale (a similar analysis is possible when the order is determined by social value). The leading example of preferences based on this separation are inequity averse preferences. Inequity Aversion is based on fairness considerations: we refer the interested reader to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for a thorough presentation. In Sections 10.1 and 10.2, we put this concept in perspective by considering two different ways that attitudes toward peers with higher and lower status can take.
Characterization of Inequity Aversion
The starting point are the basic Axioms A.1-A.6. The first additional assumption we make is that agent o evaluates peers' outcomes via his own preference:
It is easy to see that this axiom is satisfied by preferences that have the private utility representation (6) , that is, preferences that satisfy both the basic axioms and Axioms B.1-B.2. The next axiom is, instead, peculiar to inequity aversion and can be regarded as the inequity averse counterpart of the envy/pride Axiom B.1, which is clearly violated by inequity averse decision makers.
As Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 822) write, "...
[players] experience inequity if they are worse off in material terms than the other players in the experiment, and they also feel inequity if they are better off." This translates into the behavioral assumption F.2. We write the assumption by specifying two cases to make the comparison with the next case easier.
Axiom F. 2 Let x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X , j ∈ I, and c ∈ C.
1 is more proud than 2 when the implication in the above point (b) is reversed, i.e. xo, (xi) i∈I 2 yo 2 xo implies xo, (xi) i∈I 1 yo 1 xo.
In
We can now state our basic inequity aversion representation result.
Theorem 5 A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.6, F.1 and F.2 if and only if there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a diago-null function ξ : pid (u (C)) → R increasing in the second component and decreasing in the third one (w.r.t. stochastic dominance), and a probability P on Σ such that
represents on F and satisfies V (F) = u (C).
The uniqueness properties of the representation of inequity averse preferences are similar to the ones we obtained so far.
If there is no uncertainty and outcomes are monetary, an important specification of (16) is:
where γ : R → R is such that γ (0) = 0. 21 Taking
which is the specification adopted by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . The behavioral nature of our derivation allows to use behavioral data to test in a subject the relevance of fairness/inequity considerations, as opposed to, say, envy/pride ones. In fact, it is enough to check experimentally, through choice behavior, whether for example a subject tends to satisfy Axiom B.1 rather than F.2. This is a key dividend of our behavioral analysis.
Finally, observe that in the representation (18), Axiom F.2 is violated and Axiom B.1 is satisfied when β o < 0 ≤ α o . In this case (18) becomes a simple and tractable example of the private utility representation (6) . 22 This is a possibility mentioned by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , who on p. 824 of their paper observe "... we believe that there are subjects with β o < 0 ..." that is, as Veblen (1899, p. 31) wrote long time ago, there are subjects for whom "... it is extremely gratifying to possess something more than others." These subjects experience envy/pride, and so violate Axiom F.2 and satisfy B.1.
Inequity Loving
The specific characteristic of inequity aversion is the different attitude to people with lower and larger outcome. If the effect of a worsening of those with lower outcome is changed into its opposite (β o < 0 in the words of Fehr and Schmidt) then we have a different representation. Axiom F. 3 Let x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X , j ∈ I, and c ∈ C.
Agent o dislikes any improvement in the outcome of a given peer j that is above him: this is identical to the first condition of the inequity aversion Axiom F.2. He also likes a worsening of peer j below him, and this is the opposite of what is the case of the inequity aversion agent described by Axiom F. 2.
Naturally, the symmetric version of the inequity aversion representation result is:
Theorem 6 A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.6, F.1, and F.3 if and only if there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a diago-null function ξ : pid (u (C)) → R decreasing in the second and third component (w.r.t. stochastic dominance), and a probability P on Σ such that
Both representations, in Theorem 5 and 6, are based on the idea that the decision maker considers separately and differently individuals with better outcomes than his own from those who, instead, have worse outcomes. Inequity aversion assumes that any increase in inequity is disliked, whereas inequity loving is based on the idea that any improvement in the outcome of others is disliked. Neither of these two formulations seems very convincing in its pure form. The attitude toward people with lower outcomes is likely to be non monotonic, the result of the interaction of two factors: when the distance is large, compassion prevails and fear of competition is weak, while the opposite occurs when the distance is small. But, the two cases represent a potential, although extreme, attitude to the outcome of others. In any case, our framework allows to model and contrast them through behavioral (and so testable) assumptions.
Conclusions
We have developed an axiomatic analysis of preferences of decision makers that take into account the outcome of others. These social preferences are defined on profiles of acts, which include both the decision makers' acts and those of their peers. The representation we establish has a simple additive form: the subjective value for a decision maker of an acts' profile is equal to the expected utility of his own act, plus the expected value of the externality created by the peers' outcomes. This representation is arguably the most parsimonious extension of standard theory that is able to accommodate relative outcome concerns.
We provided a behavioral foundation for two different, but complementary, views on the nature of this externality: a private one, akin to regret and motivated by counterfactual thinking, and a social one, determined by the symbolic nature of outcomes.
On this basis we have carried out a systematic analysis of the intra and inter-personal comparative statics of these preferences, giving a rigorous behavioral foundation to the different social attitudes that characterize them. This analysis extends insights of prospect theory from the private to the social domain, where social gains and losses are determined by the relation between the social value of the decision makers' own outcomes and those of their peers.
This characterization has allowed us to establish in Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2009b) broad features of economies where agents exhibiting our social preferences interact. Fundamental characteristics of the equilibrium, for example the income distribution, are shown to depend on simple properties of the externality term in the representation, that is, on agents' social attitudes. This work may be considered as a further step in the line of investigation initiated long ago by Friedman and Savage (1948) and Friedman (1953) .
An interesting direction for future research is to try to bridge the gap between the axiomatic approach adopted here and other approaches that are trying to provide explanations of social preferences. In particular, it might be interesting to study which properties of the preferences that we have defined are predicted by these other models.
A Proofs and Related Material

A.1 Preliminaries
Distribution Functions
Let n, m ∈ N, I = {i 1 , ..., i n }, J = {j 1 , ..., j m }, a = (a i 1 , a i 2 , ..., a in ) ∈ R I , and b = (b j 1 , ..., b jm ) ∈ R J . In this subsection, we regroup some useful results on stochastic dominance. 
(ii) n ≤ m and F a (t) ≤ F (bj 1 ,...,b jn ) (t) for all t ∈ R.
(iii) n ≤ m and a i k ≥ b j k for all k = 1, ..., n.
A corresponding result holds for decreasing distribution functions G. 23 
Lemma 2
The following statements are equivalent:
(ii) n = m and if σ and τ are permutations of {1, ..., n} such that a i σ(1) ≤ a i σ(2) ≤ ... ≤ a i σ(n) and
(iii) n = m and there exists a permutation ζ of {1, ..., n} such that a i ζ(k) ≥ b j k for all k = 1, ..., n.
(iv) There exists a bijection π : I → J such that a i ≥ b π(i) for all i ∈ I.
(v) |I| = |J| and F a (t) ≤ F b (t) for all t ∈ R.
(vi) |I| = |J| and G a (t) ≥ G b (t) for all t ∈ R.
23 See Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2008, Lemma 6) for details.
Moreover, if I = J and a i ≥ b i for all i ∈ I, then for each z ∈ R and all t ∈ R, G (a i ) i∈I:a i ≥z (t) ≥ G (b j ) j∈J:b j ≥z (t), and F (a i ) i∈I:a i <z (t) ≤ F (b j ) j∈J:b j <z (t).
In particular, if µ a stochastically dominates µ b , then µ a (K) = µ b (K) for all K ⊆ R containing the supports of µ a and µ b (i.e., they have the same total mass). On the other hand if µ e = 0 (that is e = (e i ) i∈∅ ), then F e = 0 ≤ F d and G d ≥ 0 = G e for all d, that is µ e lower dominates and is upper dominated by every measure µ d . Therefore, if µ d stochastically dominates or is stochastically dominated by µ e , it follows that µ d = 0 (from 0 ≤ F d ≤ F e = 0 and 0 ≤ G d ≤ G e = 0, respectively). This allows to conclude that in any case stochastic dominance between µ a and µ b implies that they have the same total mass.
A.1.1 Weakly Increasing Transformations of Expected Values
Let K be a nontrivial interval in the real line, I a non-empty finite set, and be a binary relation on the hypercube K I .
Axiom 1
is complete and transitive. 
Passing to the contrapositive shows that the classical independence Axiom 5 implies Axiom 4 (under completeness).
Denote by Π (I) the set of all permutations of I.
Axiom 6 x ∼ x • π, for all x ∈ K I and each π ∈ Π (I).
Lemma 3 A binary relation on K I satisfies Axioms 1-4 if and only if there exist a probability measure m on I and a continuous and (weakly) increasing function ψ : K → R such that
In this case, satisfies Axiom 6 if and only if (20) holds for the uniform m (i.e. m i ≡ 1/ |I| for all i ∈ I).
Proof of Lemma 3. If is trivial take any m and any constant ψ (in particular, the uniform m will do).
If is not trivial, set x * y ⇔ αx + (1 − α) z αy + (1 − α) z for all α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I . Notice that (taking α = 1) this definition guarantees that x * y implies x y.
Next we show that * is complete. In fact, x * y implies αx + (1 − α) z ≺ αy + (1 − α) z for some α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I , but satisfies Axiom 4, thus αx + (1 − α) z αy + (1 − α) z for all α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I , that is y * x. Moreover, * is transitive. In fact, x * y and y * w implies αx + (1 − α) z αy + (1 − α) z and αy + (1 − α) z αw + (1 − α) z for all α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I , then αx + (1 − α) z αw + (1 − α) z for all α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I , thus x * w. Then * satisfies Axiom 1.
Next we show that * satisfies Axiom 2. Let x, y ∈ K I . If x i ≥ y i for all i in I, then αx i + (1 − α) z i ≥ αy i + (1 − α) z i for all i ∈ I, α ∈ (0, 1], and z ∈ K I , but satisfies Axiom 2, thus αx + (1 − α) z αy + (1 − α) z for all α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I , that is x * y.
Next we show that * satisfies Axiom 3. Let x, y, w ∈ K I , {β k } k∈N ⊆ [0, 1] be such that β k x + (1 − β k ) y * w for all k ∈ N, and β k → β as k → ∞. Arbitrarily choose α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I , then
Since satisfies Axiom 3, pass to the limit as k → ∞ and find
Since this is true for all α ∈ (0, 1] and z ∈ K I , it implies βx+(1 − β) y * w. Therefore {γ ∈ [0, 1] : γx + (1 − γ) y * w} is closed. Replacing * with * (and with ), the same can be proved for the set {γ ∈ [0, 1] : γx + (1 − γ) y * w}.
Next we show that * satisfies Axiom 5. Let x * y, α, β in (0, 1], and w, z in K I .
Notice that, in the second case,
1−αβ z ∈ K I is a bona fide convex combination. Thus, if αβ = 1, since x * y, αβx + (1 − αβ)
Clearly, (21) descends from x * y also if αβ = 1. Therefore x * y implies (21) for all α, β in (0, 1] and w, z in K I ; a fortiori it implies βx + (1 − β) w * βy + (1 − β) w for all β in (0, 1] and w in K I . Finally, since x * y implies x y and both relations are complete, nontriviality of implies nontriviality of * .
By the Anscombe-Aumann Theorem there exists a (unique) probability measure m on I such that x * y if and only if m · x ≥ m · y; in particular,
Consider the restriction of to the set of all constant elements of K I and the usual identification of this set with K. 24 Such restriction is clearly complete, transitive, and monotonic. Next we show that it is also topologically continuous. Let t n , t, r ∈ K be such that t n → t as n → ∞ and t n r (resp. t n r) for all n ∈ N. Since t n is converging to t ∈ K, there exist τ,
as n → ∞, t n = α n T + (1 − α n ) τ and t = αT + (1 − α) τ . Axiom 3 and α n T + (1 − α n ) τ = t n r (resp. t n r) imply t = αT + (1 − α) τ r (resp. t r). Therefore, there exists a continuous and increasing function ψ : K → R such that t r if and only if ψ (t) ≥ ψ (r). Let m be any probability measure that satisfies (22) (20) . The converse is trivial.
Assume that ψ and m represent in the sense of (20) . Notice that the set O of all probabilities p such that ψ and p represent in the sense of (20) coincides with the set of all probabilities q is such that 24 With the usual convention of denoting by t both the real number t ∈ K and the constant element t of K I taking value t for all i ∈ I.
q · x ≥ q · y implies x y. 25 Let p, q ∈ O and α in [0, 1] , then (αp
any case x y. Therefore O is convex. Assume satisfies Axiom 6, and let m ∈ O. For each π ∈ Π (I) and each
But O is convex, thus the uniform probability (1/ |I|) 1 = σ∈Π(I) (1/ |I|!) m • σ belongs to O. The converse is trivial.
A.2 Basic Axioms and Representation
Lemma 4 A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 if and only if there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a function r : X → R, with r (c Io ) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘ (N ), and a probability P on Σ such that the functional V : F → R defined by
represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C). Moreover, û,r,P is another representation of in the above sense if and only ifP = P and there exist α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such thatû = αu + β andr = αr.
Proof. The von Neumann-Morgenstern Theorem guarantees that there exists an affine function
Proof. First observe that for all c ∈ C and all I ∈ ℘ (N ), iterated application of Axiom A.5 and transitivity deliver c Io ∼ (c). Hence by Axiom A.3 there exist c, c ∈ C such that c f o , (f i ) i∈I and f o , (f i ) i∈I c. If one of the two relations is an equivalence the proof is finished. Otherwise, the above relations are strict, and, by Axiom A.2, there exist α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that (1−α)c+αc ≺ f o , (f i ) i∈I ≺ (1 − β)c + βc, and it must be α < β (u is affine on C and it represents on C). By Axiom A.3 again, there exist λ, µ ∈ (0, 1) such that ( 
In particular, there exist α * = (1 − λ) α+λβ, α * > α, and β * = (1 − µ) α + µβ, β * < β, such that, denoting (1 − α) c + αc by cαc, we have cαc ≺ cα * c ≺ f ≺ cβ * c ≺ cβc and α < α * < β * < β. (Call this argument: "shrinking".)
Suppose f ≺ cγc, then cαc ≺ f ≺ cγc and (shrinking) there exists γ * < γ such that f ≺ cγ * c ≺ cγc. Therefore sup {δ ∈ [0, 1] : cδc ≺ f } ≤ γ * < γ, which is absurd. Suppose cγc ≺ f , then cγc ≺ f ≺ cβc and (shrinking) there exists γ * > γ such that cγc ≺ cγ * c ≺ f . Therefore sup {δ ∈ [0, 1] : xδy ≺ f } ≥ γ * > γ, which is absurd.
Conclude that f ∼ cγc ∈ C.
Proof. Define a f (s) = c f,k if s ∈ A k (for k = 1, ..., n) . The map a : S → C is a simple act, and a f (s) ∼ f (s) (24) for all s ∈ S. 26 In particular, Axiom A.2 implies a f ∼ f . By Axiom A.1, there exist f, g ∈ F such that f g. It follows from Claim 4.2 that a f (a g ). Thus, the restriction of to A (or more precisely to the subset of F consisting of elements of the form f = (a) for some a ∈ A = A o ) satisfies the assumptions of the Anscombe-Aumann Theorem. Then there exist a probability P on Σ and a non-constant affine function u : C → R such that (a) (b) ⇔ S u (a (s)) dP (s) ≥ S u (b (s)) dP (s), provided a, b ∈ A. 27 For all x ∈ X set U (x) ≡ u (c x ) provided c x ∈ C and x ∼ (c x ), clearly, U is well defined (on X ). Moreover, as observed, c Io ∼ (c) for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘ (N ), thus U (c Io ) = u (c).
Let f, g in F and take a f and a g in A such that a f (s) ∼ f (s) and (a g (s)) ∼ g (s) for every
and c ∈ C, and
for all f o , (f i ) i∈I ∈ F. Which delivers representation (23) . Moreover, for all c ∈ C, u (c) = V (c) ∈ V (F) and conversely, for all f ∈ F,
Conversely, assume that there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a function r : X → R with r (c Io ) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘ (N ), and a probability P on Σ, such that representation (23) holds and V (F) = u (C). 28 Then:
Proving necessity of the axioms for the representation is a standard exercise. We report it just for the sake of completeness. Completeness and transitivity of are obvious, nontriviality descends from (iv) above and the fact that u is not constant: Axiom A.1 holds. Let f, g ∈ F be such that f (s) g (s) for all s ∈ S, then, by (s) )] dP (s), which together with representation (23) delivers f g: Axiom A.2 holds. Axiom A.3 holds because of (iv), V (F) = u (C), and affinity of u. Axiom A.4 holds because of (iii). Finally, for all I ∈ ℘ (N ), j ∈ N \I, and c ∈ C, by (iv), V (c Io ) = u (c) = V c Io∪{j} and Axiom A.5 holds.
Letû : C → R a non-constant affine function,r : X → R a function withr (c Io ) = 0 for all I ∈ ℘ (N ) and c ∈ C, andP be a probability on Σ, such that the functionalV : F → R, defined
Notice that u represents on C, hence w.l.o.g. this u is the same u we considered at the very beginning of this proof. 28 Notice that r • f : S → R is a simple and measurable function for all f ∈ F , hence the integral in (23) is well defined. Sû (a (s)) dP (s) , for all a ∈ A, is an Anscombe-Aumann representation of on A. ThereforeP = P , and there exist α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such thatû = αu + β. For all x ∈ X , take c ∈ C such thatV (x) =û (c), then, by (iv), x ∼ (c) and, by (iv) again, V (x) = u (c). Points (i) and
, that is,r = αr. Conversely, if there exist α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such thatû = αu + β,r = αr, andP = P , thenû : C → R is a non-constant affine function,r : X → R is a function withr (c Io ) = 0 for all I ∈ ℘ (N ) and c ∈ C,P is a probability on
Lemma 5 Let be a binary relation on F that satisfy Axiom A.1. The following conditions are equivalent:
satisfies Axioms A.6 and B.1.
(ii) If x o , (x i ) i∈I , x o , (y j ) j∈J ∈ X and there is a bijection π : J → I such that y j x π(j) for all
Else, we can assume J = {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j n } and, observing that y j w j for all j ∈ J, repeated applications of Axiom B.1 deliver that x o , (x i ) i∈I ∼ (x o , w j 1 , w j 2 , ..., w jn ) (x o , y j 1 , w j 2 , ..., w jn ) (x o , y j 1 , y j 2 , ..., w jn ) ...
(ii)⇒(i). Assume x o , (x i ) i∈I , x o , (y j ) j∈J in X are such that there is a bijection π : J → I such that y j = x π(j) for all j ∈ J. Then a fortiori, y j x π(j) and by (ii)
Assume x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X , j / ∈ I, and c c. Consider
consider the identity π :
Proof of Theorem 1 First observe that for all I, J ∈ ℘ (N ), (x i ) i∈I ∈ C I , (y j ) j∈J ∈ C J the following facts are equivalent:
• There is a bijection π : J → I such that y j = x π(j) .
• µ (x i ) i∈I = µ (y j ) j∈J .
By Lemma 4, there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a function r : X → R with r (c Io ) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘ (N ), and a probability P on Σ, such that the functional V : F → R, defined by (23), represents and satisfies
Finally, let c ∈ C and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N |. Choose I ∈ ℘ (N ) with |I| = n, then (c, nδ c ) = r (c Io ) = 0. That is, is diago-null. This concludes the proof of the sufficiency part.
For the proof of necessity, set r x o , (x i ) i∈I = x o , µ (x i ) i∈I for all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X to obtain that satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 (Lemma 4). Moreover, if x o , (x i ) i∈I , x o , (y j ) j∈J ∈ X and there is a bijection π : J → I such that y j = x π(j) for all j ∈ J, then µ (x i ) i∈I = µ (y j ) j∈J , and hence
Therefore Axiom A.6 holds too.
Proof of Proposition 1 This Proposition immediately follows from Lemma 4.
A.3 Private Utility Representation
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 4, there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a function r : X → R with r (c Io ) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘ (N ), and a probability P on Σ, such that the functional V : F → R, defined by (23), represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C).
Next we show that if x o , (x i ) i∈I , x o , (y j ) j∈J ∈ X and µ (u(x i )) i∈I stochastically dominates
The obtained function θ is decreasing in the second component with respect to stochastic dominance. If µ (u(x i )) i∈I stochastically dominates µ (u(y j )) j∈J , then Lemma 2 guarantees that there exists a
Axioms A.6 and B.1 and Lemma 5 yield
, and is increasing in the first component and decreasing in the second component with respect to stochastic dominance.
Let
Finally, let z ∈ u (C) and 0 ≤ n ≤ |N |. Choose c ∈ C such that u (c) = z and I ∈ ℘ (N ) with |I| = n, then (z, nδ z ) = u (c) , i∈I δ u(c) = θ c, i∈I δ u(c) = r (c Io ) = 0. That is is diago-null. This concludes the proof of the sufficiency part, since r x o , (
For the proof of necessity, set r x o , (x i ) i∈I = u (x o ) , µ (u(x i )) i∈I for all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X to obtain that satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 (Lemma 4).
Let x o , (x i ) i∈I and x o , (y j ) j∈J in X be such that there exists a bijection π : J → I such that y j x π(j) for all j ∈ J. Then u (y j ) ≥ u x π(j) for all j ∈ J, and by Lemma 2, j∈J δ u(y j ) stochasti-
By Lemma 5, satisfies Axiom A.6 and Axiom B.1.
Proof of Proposition 2. Omitted (it is very similar to the one of Proposition 3).
A.4 Social Value Representation
Lemma 6 Let be a binary relation on F that satisfy Axioms A.1-A.5 and A.7. The following conditions are equivalent:
satisfies Axiom A.6,
and there is a bijection π : J → I such that y j˙ x π(j) for all
Else we can assume J = {j 1 , j 2 , ..., j n } and, observing that y j˙ w j for all j ∈ J, conclude
all i ∈ J, and hence x o , (x i ) i∈I x o , (y j ) j∈J . Therefore x o , (x i ) i∈I ∼ x o , (y j ) j∈J and Axiom A.6 holds.
Lemma 6 plays for the proof of Theorem 3 the role that Lemma 5 plays for the proof of Theorem 2, as we see in the next proof.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 4, there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a function r : X → R with r (c Io ) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘ (N ), and a probability P on Σ, such that the functional V : F → R, defined by (23), represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C). Moreover, by Axiom A.7, there exists v : C → R that represents˙ .
Next we show that if x o , (x i ) i∈I , x o , (y j ) j∈J ∈ X and µ (v(x i )) i∈I stochastically dominates
The obtained function θ is decreasing in the second component with respect to stochastic dominance. If µ (v(x i )) i∈I stochastically dominates µ (v(y j )) j∈J , then Lemma 2 guarantees that there exists a bijection π : I → J such that v (x i ) ≥ v y π(i) for all i ∈ I, therefore x i˙ y π(i) for all i ∈ I. Since satisfies Axioms A.1-A.8, Lemma 6 yields
Like in the Proof of Theorem 2, it can be shown that if (
Also the proof of diago-nullity of is similar to the one we detailed for Theorem 2.
For the proof of necessity, set r x o , (
satisfies Axioms A.1-A.5 (Lemma 4). Moreover, since v is non-constant affine and it represents˙ , then satisfies Axiom A.7.
Let x o , (x i ) i∈I and x o , (y j ) j∈J in X be such that there exists a bijection π : J → I such that
That is, Axiom A.8 holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let û,v,ˆ ,P be another representation of and˙ in the sense of
for all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X . By Lemma 4, there exist α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such thatû = αu + β, r = αr, andP = P . Moreover, sincev represents˙ , there areα,β ∈ R withα > 0 such thatv = αv +β. Let z, i∈I δ z i ∈ pim (v (C)), then there exist
) i∈I , and fromr = αr it follows that
Conversely, ifP = P , and there exist α, β,α,β ∈ R with α,α > 0 such thatû = αu+β,v =αv +β, andˆ z, i∈I δ z i = α α −1 z −β , i∈I δα −1 (zi−β) for all z, i∈I δ z i ∈ pim (v (C)), thenû,v : C → R are non-constant affine, it is easy to check thatˆ : pim (v (C)) → R is well defined, diago-null, increasing in the first component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second,P is a probability on Σ,v represents˙ , and
obviously represents on F; finallyV (F) = αV (F) + β = αu (C) + β =û (C).
A.5 Private versus Social
Proof of Proposition 4. (iii)⇒(i) and (ii). If coincides with˙ on C, then A.7 is satisfied (Lemma 4 guarantees that , hence˙ , is represented on C by an affine non-constant function u : C → R).
If c c , then c˙ c , that is x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} , for all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X and j / ∈ I. Then Axiom B.1 is satisfied. Moreover, c c implies that c˙ c , thus (by definition of˙ ) there exist x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X and
That is, Axiom B.3 holds.
(ii)⇒(iii). By Axiom B.3, c c implies that c˙ c , for all c, c ∈ C. Moreover, c c implies c˙ c , for all c, c ∈ C; that is, c˙ c implies c c .
(i)⇒(iii). By Axiom B.1, c c implies that c˙ c , for all c, c ∈ C. Moreover, Lemma 4 guarantees that is represented by an affine non-constant function u : C → R, Axiom A.7 guarantees that˙ is represented by an affine non-constant function v : C → R, it follows that there are α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such that v = αu + β, that is coincides with˙ on C.
A.6 Average Payoff
Proof of Theorem 4. By Theorem 3 there exist two non-constant affine functions u, v : C → R, a diago-null function : pim (v (C)) → R increasing in the first component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second, and a probability P on Σ, such that v represents˙ and the function V : F → R, defined by (9), represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C). Fix z ∈ v (C) and I ∈ ℘ (N ) \∅. Consider the relation on v (C) I defined by (z i ) i∈I z,I (w i ) i∈I if and only if there exist
In particular, (z i ) i∈I z,I (w i ) i∈I if and only if z, µ (z i ) i∈I ≤ z, µ (w i ) i∈I , thus z,I is complete, transitive, monotonic, symmetric (that is it satisfies Axioms 1, 2, 6).
If there existᾱ ∈ (0, 1] and
=z j , and v (y j ) = w j for all j ∈ I, and notice that {α ∈ [0, 1] : 
Next we show that if (z, µ) , (z, µ ) ∈ pim (v (C)) \ {(z, 0)} and E (µ) = E (µ ), 30 then (z, µ) = (z, µ ).
• If µ (v (C)) = µ (v (C)) = n (which must be positive), let I be an arbitrarily chosen subset of I with cardinality n. Then there exist (z i ) i∈I , (w i ) i∈I ∈ v (C) I such that µ = µ (z i ) i∈I and µ = µ (w i ) i∈I . E (µ) = E (µ ) and (26) imply that (z i ) i∈I ∼ z,I (w i ) i∈I which amounts to z, µ (z i ) i∈I = z, µ (w i ) i∈I , i.e., (z, µ) = (z, µ ) .
• If µ (v (C)) = n and µ (v (C)) = m, then there exist x = x o , (x i ) i∈I and x o , (y j ) j∈J with |I| = n and |J| = m such that z = v (x o ), µ = µ (v(x i )) i∈I and µ = µ (v(y j )) j∈J . Let c ∈ C be such that c ∼ x, then c Io ∼ x, that is (c, c I ) ∼ x o , (x i ) i∈I and by Axiom A.9, given any class {J i } i∈I of disjoint subsets of N with |J i | = m for all i ∈ I, c, (
By an identical argument we can consider an n-replica x o , (ȳ l ) l∈L of
where L is the set define above) and show that
) l∈L , and the last indifference descends from E µ (v(x l )) l∈L = E (µ) = E (µ ) = E µ (v(ȳ l )) l∈L and (26).
is diago-null, increasing in the first component and decreasing in the second on v (C), and (z, µ) = η (z, E (µ)) for all (z, µ) ∈ pim (v (C)).
It only remains to show that η is continuously decreasing in the second component on v (C).
{i} . Therefore, there exists a strictly increasing function
The proof of sufficiency is concluded by renaming η into . To prove necessity, assume there exist two non-constant affine functions u, v : C → R, a diago-null function η : v (C) × (v (C) ∪ {∞}) → R increasing in the first component and continuously decreasing in the second on v (C), and a probability P on Σ, such that v represents˙ and the function defined
and satisfies V (F) = u (C). Set (z, µ) = η (z, E (µ)) for all (z, µ) ∈ pim (v (C)) (with the above convention E (0) = ∞). It is clear that is diago-null, increasing in the first component and decreasing (w.r.t. stochastic dominance) in the second, and hence, by Theorem 3, on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.8. It remains to show that satisfies Axioms A.9, A.10, and A.11.
As observed, for all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X , all m ∈ N, and each m-replica
As to Axiom A.10, let x o , (x i ) i∈I , x o , (y i ) i∈I ∈ X and assume that
hence, since η is decreasing in the second component on v (C), |I|
: v (C) → R be a weakly decreasing and continuous function such that for all t,t ∈ v (C),
(which exists since η (v (x o ) , ·) is continuously decreasing on v (C)). Then, for all n ∈ N, the preference
, and continuity of
x o , (y i ) i∈I } is closed, and analogous considerations hold for {α ∈ [0, 1] :
Thus is more envious than proud. Finally, inequality (13) easily follows from (12) . In fact, let v (x o ) = r ∈ int (v (D)), since (r, r) = 0, D Before entering the details of the proof of Proposition 6, recall that an event E ∈ Σ is essential if c cEc c for some c and c in C. Representation (10) guarantees that this amounts to say that P (E) ∈ (0, 1), in particular, ethically neutral events are essential.
We say that a preference is averse to social risk, relatively to an essential event E, a convex set D ⊆ C, and a given
Notice that this definition is consistent with the previous one in which only ethically neutral events E where considered (thus P (E) = 1/2). Instead of proving Proposition 6 we will prove the more general
Proposition 11
If admits a representation (10), then is averse to social risk, relative to an essential event E, a convex D ⊆ C, and
Proof of Proposition 11. Assume is averse to social risk, relative to an essential event E, a convex D ⊆ C, and x o ∈ C. Essentiality of E guarantees that P (E) = p ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, for 
A.8 Comparative Interdependence
Proof of Proposition 7. (i)⇒(ii) Taking I = ∅, since u 1 and u 2 are affine, non-constant, and represent 1 and 2 on C, we obtain u 1 ≈ u 2 . W.l.o.g. choose u 1 = u 2 = u. For all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X choose c ∈ C such that x o , (x i ) i∈I ∼ 1 c, then x o , (x i ) i∈I 2 c and u (x o )+ 2 x o , µ (x) i∈I ≥ u (c) = u (x o ) + 1 x o , µ (x) i∈I , that is 2 ≥ 2 on pim (C).
(ii)⇒(i) Take u 1 = u 2 = u. If x o , (x i ) i∈I 1 c Io , then u (x o ) + 1 x o , µ (x) i∈I ≥ u (c) hence u (x o ) + 2 x o , µ (x) i∈I ≥ u (c) and x o , (x i ) i∈I 2 c Io . As wanted.
Proof of Proposition 8. By Proposition 7, (i) is equivalent to u 1 ≈ u 2 and, choosing u 1 = u 2 , (ii)⇒(i) Since u 1 and u 2 are affine, if 1 is intrinsically equivalent to 2 , then u 1 ≈ u 2 . W.l.o.g. choose u 1 = u 2 = u. For all x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X choose c such that c ∼ 2 x o , (x i ) i∈I , i.e. u (c) = u (x o ) + 2 x o , µ (x) i∈I , and c such that c ∼ 1 x o , (x i ) i∈I .
If 2 x o , µ (x) i∈I < 0, then u (x o ) + 2 x o , µ (x) i∈I < u (x o ) and x o 2 c ∼ 2 x o , (x i ) i∈I , which implies x o 1 c 1 x o , (x i ) i∈I and u (x o ) + 1 x o , µ (x) i∈I ≤ u (c) < u (x o ), thus 1 x o , µ (x) i∈I ≤ u (c) − u (x o ) = 2 x o , µ (x) i∈I . Analogously, if 1 x o , µ (x) i∈I > 0, then 2 x o , µ (x) i∈I ≥ u (c) − u (x o ) = 1 x o , µ (x) i∈I . Conclude that: if 2 (·) < 0 then 1 (·) ≤ 2 (·), if 2 (·) ≥ 0, then either 1 (·) > 0 and 1 (·) ≤ 2 (·) or 1 (·) ≤ 0 and 1 (·) ≤ 0 ≤ 2 (·). In any case 1 (·) ≤ 2 (·).
Proof of Proposition 9. Omitted (it is very similar to the previous ones).
A.9 Inequity Aversion
For the proof of the Theorem 5, we begin with a preliminary lemma Lemma 7 A binary relation on F satisfies Axioms A.1-A.6 and F.1 if and only if there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a diago-null function : pim (u (C)) → R, and a probability P on Σ, such that the function V : F → R, defined by
, µ (u(f i (s))) i∈I dP (s) (27) for all f o , (f i ) i∈I ∈ F, represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C).
The triplet û,ˆ ,P is another representation of in the above sense if and only ifP = P and there exist α, β ∈ R with α > 0 such thatû = αu + β, and z, i∈I δ z i = α α −1 (z − β) ,
Proof. By Lemma 4, there exist a non-constant affine function u : C → R, a function r : X → R with r (c Io ) = 0 for all c ∈ C and I ∈ ℘ (N ), and a probability P on Σ, such that the functional V : F → R, defined by (23), represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C). Next we show that if x o , (x i ) i∈I , y o , (y j ) j∈J ∈ X , u (x o ) = u (y o ), and µ (u(x i )) i∈I = µ (u(y j )) j∈J , then r x o , (x i ) i∈I = r y o , (y j ) j∈J . Therefore, for (z, µ) ∈ pim (u (C)), it is well posed to define (z, µ) = r x o , (x i ) i∈I provided z = u (x o ) and µ = µ (u(x i )) i∈I . But first notice that at least one x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X such that z = u (x o ) and µ = µ (u(x i )) i∈I exists for every (z, µ) ∈ pim (u (C)). 33 If µ (u(x i )) i∈I = µ (u(y j )) j∈J = 0, then I = J = ∅. In this case, r x o , (x i ) i∈I = r (x o ) = 0 = r (y o ) = r y o , (y j ) j∈J . Else if µ (u(x i )) i∈I = µ (u(y j )) j∈J = 0, then, by Lemma 2, there is a bijection π : I → J such that u (x i ) = u y π(i) for all i ∈ I. Then y π(i) ∼ x i and y o ∼ x o . Axiom F.1 guarantees that x o , (x i ) i∈I ∼ y o , y π(i) i∈I . Consider the inverse bijection π −1 : J → I and notice that y j = y π(π −1 (j)) for all j ∈ J, then Axiom A.6 delivers y o , y π(i) i∈I ∼ y o , (y j ) j∈J and u (x o ) + 33 In any case take xo ∈ u −1 (z) . If µ = 0 take I = ∅. Else if µ = n k=1 δz k for some n ≥ 1, take a subset I = {i1, ..., in} of N with cardinality n and arbitrarily choose xi k ∈ u −1 (z k ) for all k = 1, ..., n.
Define (z, µ) ≡ ξ z, r∈supp(µ):r<z µ (r) δ r , r∈supp(µ):r≥z µ (r) δ r and notice that (z, nδ z ) = ξ (z, 0, nδ z ) = 0 for all z in u (C) and all non-negative integers n ≤ |N |. Thus u : C → R is a nonconstant affine function, : pim (u (C)) → R is a diago-null function, and P is a probability on Σ, such that the function V : F → R, defined by for all f o , (f i ) i∈I ∈ F, represents and satisfies V (F) = u (C). Lemma 7 guarantees that satisfies Axioms A.1-A.6 and F.1. Next we show that satisfies Axiom F.2. Let x o , (x i ) i∈I ∈ X , j ∈ I, and c ∈ C.
If c x j x o . Then u (c) ≥ u (x j ) ≥ u (x o ), and, by Lemma 2, i∈I−{j}:u(x i )≥u(xo) δ u(x i ) + δ u(c) stochastically dominates i∈I:u(x i )≥u(xo) δ u(x i ) .
Then, ξ u (x o ) , i∈I:u(x i )<u(xo) δ u(x i ) , i∈I:u(x i )≥u(xo) δ u(x i ) ≥ ξ u (x o ) , i∈I:u(x i )<u(xo) δ u(x i ) , i∈I−{j}:u(x i )≥u(xo) δ u(x i ) + δ u(c) and we conclude x o , (x i ) i∈I x o , (x i ) i∈I\{j} , c {j} . Else, if c x j ≺ x o , then u (c) ≤ u (x j ) < u (x o ), and, by Lemma 2, i∈I:u(x i )<u(xo) δ u(x i ) stochastically dominates i∈I−{j}:u(x i )<u(xo) δ u(x i ) + δ u(c) . Then, ξ u (x o ) , i∈I:u(x i )<u(xo) δ u(x i ) , i∈I:u(x i )≥u(xo) δ u(x i ) ≥ ξ u (x o ) , i∈I−{j}:u(x i )<u(xo) δ u(x i ) +δ u(c) , i∈I:u(x i )≥u(xo) δ u(x i ) and we conclude x o , (x i ) i∈I x o , (x i ) i∈I\{j} , c {j} . This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6. Omitted since it is very similar to that of Theorem 5.
A.10 The Social Value Order
In this section, we provide the behavioral versions of Axiom A.7 for the social value order˙ introduced in Section 5. The first axiom requires that the decision maker be consistent across groups in his social ranking of outcomes.
Axiom A. 12 (Group Invariance) Given any c, d ∈ C, if (x o , (x i ) i∈I , d {j} ) (x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} ) (28) for some (x o , (x i ) i∈I ) ∈ X and j / ∈ I, then there is no other (x o , (x i ) i∈I ) ∈ X and j / ∈ I such that (x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} ) (x o , (x i ) i∈I , d {j} ).
The ranking˙ is thus group invariant, that is, it does not depend on the particular peers' group in which the decision maker happens to make the comparison (28) . In terms of the representation, Axiom A.12 implies that the function v does not depend on I. Axiom A.12 can be regarded as a group anonymity axiom, that is, it does not matter the particular group where a choice is made. Like the anonymity Axiom A.6, this condition guarantees that only outcomes per se matter and it thus allows us to study in purity the relative outcomes effects, our main object of interest.
The following axiom guarantees that the preference˙ is nontrivial.
Axiom A. 13 (Non-triviality) There are c, d ∈ C, (x o , (x i ) i∈I ) ∈ X and j / ∈ I such that
The next two axioms just require standard independence and Archimedean conditions with respect to a given peer j's outcome. To ease notation, cαd denotes (1 − α) c + αd.
Axiom A. 14 (Outcome Independence) Let α ∈ (0, 1) and c, d, e ∈ C. If (x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} ) (x o , (x i ) i∈I , d {j} ) for some (x o , (x i ) i∈I ) ∈ X and j / ∈ I, then (x o , (x i ) i∈I , cαe {j} ) (x o , (x i ) i∈I , dαe {j} )
for some (x o , (x i ) i∈I ) ∈ X and j / ∈ I. for some (x o , (x i ) i∈I ), (y o , (y h ) h∈H ) ∈ X , j / ∈ I, k / ∈ H, α, β ∈ (0, 1).
Axioms A.12-A.15 correspond to Axiom A.7.
Lemma 8 Let satisfy A.1. Then A.12-A.15 are equivalent to Axiom A.7.
Proof of Lemma 8. Assume satisfy A.12-A. 15 . If not d˙ c, then there are (x o , (x i ) i∈I ) ∈ X and j / ∈ I such that not (x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} ) (x o , (x i ) i∈I , d {j} ). By A.1, (x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} ) ≺ (x o , (x i ) i∈I , d {j} ). By A.12 and A.1, for all (x o , (x i ) i∈I ) ∈ X and j / ∈ I, (x o , (x i ) i∈I , c {j} ) (x o , (x i ) i∈I , d {j} ), by definition c˙ d. Thus˙ is complete. Transitivity follows from A.1, and˙ is a weak order. It is readily checked that A.13, A.14, and A.15 imply that˙ is nontrivial, independent, and Archimedean, respectively. The converse is trivial.
